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This is an exciting and unprecedented age of digital opportunity, and this
government is committed to unleashing the full power of this country’s first-
class technology and boosting our standing in the world. Digital advances
will undoubtedly drive our economy and enrich our society, but to fully
harness the internet’s advantages, we must confront the online threats and
harms it can propagate, and protect those who are vulnerable to them.
That’s why we want to make the UK the safest place in the world to be online
and the best place to start and grow a digital business. We will make sure the
benefits of technology are spread more widely and shared more fairly. Our
approach is guided by the need to promote fair and efficient markets where
the benefits of technology are shared widely across communities; ensure the
safety and security of those online; and maintain a thriving democracy and
society, where pluralism and freedom of expression are protected.
By getting it right, we will drive growth and stimulate innovation and new
ideas, whilst giving confidence and certainty to innovators and building trust
amongst consumers. As we leave the EU, we have an incredible opportunity
to lead the world in regulatory innovation.
As the internet continues to grow and transform our lives it is essential that
we get the balance right between a thriving, open and vibrant virtual world,
and one in which users are protected from harm.
The scale, severity and complexity of online child sexual exploitation and
abuse is a concern for government, law enforcement and companies, with
16.8 million referrals of child sexual abuse material by US technology
companies to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children in
2019. In the UK, law enforcement is making 500 arrests and safeguarding
700 children a month as a result of these referrals and other sources.
Terrorist propaganda and vile online child sexual abuse destroy lives and tear
families and communities apart. We cannot allow these harmful behaviours
and content to undermine the significant benefits that the digital revolution
can offer.
Two thirds of adults in the UK are concerned about content online, and close
to half say that they have seen hateful content in the past year. Online abuse
can have a severe impact on people’s lives and is often targeted at the most
vulnerable in our society. Cyberbullying has been shown to have
psychological and emotional impact. In a large survey of young people who
had been cyberbullied, 37% had developed depression and 26% had suicidal
thoughts. These figures are higher than corresponding statistics for ‘offline’
bullying, indicating the increased potential for harm.
This update shares some of the findings from the Online Harms White Paper
consultation, as we work to ensure the digital revolution works for families,
communities and businesses. We are grateful to everybody who responded
to the consultation on our proposals to eradicate these corrosive and
abhorrent harms. There were some clear themes amongst the responses
which we will pay close attention to as we move towards the legislation
announced in the Queen’s Speech.
Firstly, freedom of expression, and the role of a free press, is vital to a
healthy democracy. We will ensure that there are safeguards in the
legislation, so companies and the new regulator have a clear responsibility
to protect users’ rights online, including freedom of expression and the need
to maintain a vibrant and diverse public square.
We are also introducing greater transparency about content removal, with
the opportunity for users to appeal. We will not prevent adults from
accessing or posting legal content, nor require companies to remove
specific pieces of legal content. The new regulatory framework will instead
require companies, where relevant, to explicitly state what content and
behaviour is acceptable on their sites and then for platforms to enforce this
consistently.
Secondly, respondents emphasised the need for clarity and certainty for
businesses, and proportionate regulation. Analysis so far suggests that
fewer than 5% of UK businesses will be in scope of this regulatory
framework. The ‘duty of care’ will only apply to companies that facilitate the
sharing of user generated content, for example through comments, forums
or video sharing. Just because a business has a social media presence, does
not mean it will be in scope of the regulation. Business to business services,
which provide virtual infrastructure to businesses for storing and sharing
content, will not have requirements placed on them.
Thirdly, many respondents reinforced the importance of higher levels of
protection for children, which will be reflected in the policy we develop
through this consultation. The proposals assume a higher level of protection
for children than for the typical adult user, including, where appropriate,
measures to prevent children from accessing age-inappropriate or harmful
content. This approach will achieve a more consistent and comprehensive
approach to harmful content across different sites and go further than the
Digital Economy Act’s focus on online pornography on commercial adult
sites.
On the question of who will be taking on the role of the regulator, having
listened to feedback from this consultation, we are minded to appoint
Ofcom. This would allow us to build on Ofcom’s expertise, avoid
fragmentation of the regulatory landscape and enable quick progress on this
important issue.
We are a pro-technology government and we are keen to continue to work
with industry to drive forward the digital agenda. We are continuing to work
at pace to ensure the right regulatory regime and legislation is in place. The
ICO has recently published its Age Appropriate Design Code, and more
detailed proposals on online harms regulation will be released in the spring
alongside interim voluntary codes on tackling online terrorist and child
sexual exploitation and abuse content and activity.
In the meantime, we will continue our efforts to unlock the huge
opportunities presented by digital technologies whilst minimising the risks.
To ensure that we keep momentum on a comprehensive package of
measures we will be publishing and undertaking further work to address
online harms, such as:
● government media literacy strategy
● The Law Commission’s consultation on abusive and offensive online
communications
● a review into the market for technology designed to improve online safety,
where the UK is a leading innovator
● developing our understanding and evidence base of online harms and
approaches to tackling them. This is why we have supported cross-
government research to understand how platforms can recognise their child
users through age assurance
We are confident that this publication, and the other plans we are driving
forward, will help us to achieve our objectives; making Britain the safest
place to be online and the best digital economy in the world.
The Rt Hon Baroness Morgan of Cotes
Secretary of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport
The Rt Hon Priti Patel MP
Secretary of State, Home Office
Executive summary
1. The Online Harms White Paper set out the intention to improve
protections for users online through the introduction of a new duty of care
on companies and an independent regulator responsible for overseeing this
framework. The White Paper proposed that this regulation follow a
proportionate and risk-based approach, and that the duty of care be
designed to ensure that all companies have appropriate systems and
processes in place to react to concerns over harmful content and improve
the safety of their users - from effective complaint mechanisms to
transparent decision-making over actions taken in response to reports of
harm.
2. The consultation ran from 8 April 2019 to 1 July 2019. It received over
2,400 responses ranging from companies in the technology industry
including large tech giants and small and medium sized enterprises,
academics, think tanks, children’s charities, rights groups, publishers,
governmental organisations and individuals. In parallel to the consultation
process, we have undertaken extensive engagement over the last 12 months
with representatives from industry, civil society and others. This
engagement is reflected in the response.
3. This initial government response provides an overview of the consultation
responses and wider engagement on the proposals in the White Paper. It
includes an in-depth breakdown of the responses to each of the 18
consultation questions asked in relation to the White Paper proposals, and
an overview of the feedback in response to our engagement with
stakeholders. This document forms an iterative part of the policy
development process. We are committed to taking a deliberative and open
approach to ensure that we get the detail of this complex and novel policy
right. While it does not provide a detailed update on all policy proposals, it
does give an indication of our direction of travel in a number of key areas
raised as overarching concern across some responses.
4. In particular, while the risk-based and proportionate approach proposed
by the White Paper was positively received by those we consulted with,
written responses and our engagement highlighted questions over a number
of areas, including freedom of expression and the businesses in scope of the
duty of care. Having carefully considered the information gained during this
process, we have made a number of developments to our policies. These are
clarified in the ‘Our Response’ section below.
5. This consultation has been a critical part of the development of this policy
and we are grateful to those who took part. This feedback is being factored
into the development of this policy, and we will continue to engage with
users, industry and civil society as we continue to refine our policies ahead of
publication of the full policy response. We believe that an agile and
proportionate approach to regulation, developed in collaboration with
stakeholders, will strengthen a free and open internet by providing a
framework that builds public trust, while encouraging innovation and
providing confidence to investors.
Our response
Freedom of expression
1. The consultation responses indicated that some respondents were
concerned that the proposals could impact freedom of expression online.
We recognise the critical importance of freedom of expression, both as a
fundamental right in itself and as an essential enabler of the full range of
other human rights protected by UK and international law. As a result, the
overarching principle of the regulation of online harms is to protect users’
rights online, including the rights of children and freedom of expression.
Safeguards for freedom of expression have been built in throughout the
framework. Rather than requiring the removal of specific pieces of legal
content, regulation will focus on the wider systems and processes that
platforms have in place to deal with online harms, while maintaining a
proportionate and risk-based approach.
2. To ensure protections for freedom of expression, regulation will establish
differentiated expectations on companies for illegal content and activity,
versus conduct that is not illegal but has the potential to cause harm.
Regulation will therefore not force companies to remove specific pieces of
legal content. The new regulatory framework will instead require companies,
where relevant, to explicitly state what content and behaviour they deem to
be acceptable on their sites and enforce this consistently and transparently.
All companies in scope will need to ensure a higher level of protection for
children, and take reasonable steps to protect them from inappropriate or
harmful content.
3. Services in scope of the regulation will need to ensure that illegal content
is removed expeditiously and that the risk of it appearing is minimised by
effective systems. Reflecting the threat to national security and the physical
safety of children, companies will be required to take particularly robust
action to tackle terrorist content and online child sexual exploitation and
abuse.
4. Recognising concerns about freedom of expression, the regulator will not
investigate or adjudicate on individual complaints. Companies will be able to
decide what type of legal content or behaviour is acceptable on their
services, but must take reasonable steps to protect children from harm.
They will need to set this out in clear and accessible terms and conditions
and enforce these effectively, consistently and transparently. The proposed
approach will improve transparency for users about which content is and is
not acceptable on different platforms, and will enhance users’ ability to
challenge removal of content where this occurs.
5. Companies will be required to have effective and proportionate user
redress mechanisms which will enable users to report harmful content and
to challenge content takedown where necessary. This will give users clearer,
more effective and more accessible avenues to question content takedown,
which is an important safeguard for the right to freedom of expression.
These processes will need to be transparent, in line with terms and
conditions, and consistently applied.
Ensuring clarity for businesses
6. We recognise the need for businesses to have certainty, and will ensure
that guidance is provided to help businesses understand potential risks
arising from different types of service, and the actions that businesses would
need to take to comply with the duty of care as a result. We will ensure that
the regulator consults with relevant stakeholders to ensure the guidance is
clear and practicable.
Businesses in scope
7. The legislation will only apply to companies that provide services or use
functionality on their websites which facilitate the sharing of user generated
content or user interactions, for example through comments, forums or
video sharing. Our assessment is that only a very small proportion of UK
businesses (estimated to account to less than 5%) fit within that definition.
To ensure clarity, guidance will be provided by the regulator to help
businesses understand whether or not the services they provide or
functionality contained on their website would fall into the scope of the
regulation.
8. Just because a business has a social media page that does not bring it in
scope of regulation. Equally, a business would not be brought in scope
purely by providing referral or discount codes on its website to be shared
with other potential customers on social media. It would be the social media
platform hosting the content that is in scope, not the business using its
services to advertise or promote their company. To be in scope, a business
would have to operate its own website with the functionality to enable
sharing of user-generated content, or user interactions. We will introduce
this legislation proportionately, minimising the regulatory burden on small
businesses. Most small businesses where there is a lower risk of harm
occurring will not have to make disproportionately burdensome changes to
their service to be compliant with the proposed regulation.
9. Regulation must be proportionate and based on evidence of risk of harm
and what can feasibly be expected of companies. We anticipate that the
regulator would assess the business impacts of any new requirements it
introduces. Final policy positions on proportionality will, therefore, align
with the evidence of risk of harm and impact to business. Business-to-
business services have very limited opportunities to prevent harm occurring
to individuals and as such will be out of scope of regulation.
Identity of the regulator
11. We are minded to make Ofcom the new regulator, in preference to giving
this function to a new body or to another existing organisation. This
preference is based on its organisational experience, robustness, and
experience of delivering challenging, high-profile remits across a range of
sectors. Ofcom is a well-established and experienced regulator, recently
assuming high profile roles such as regulation of the BBC. Ofcom’s focus on
the communications sector means it already has relationships with many of
the major players in the online arena, and its spectrum licensing duties mean
that it is practised at dealing with large numbers of small businesses.
12. We judge that such a role is best served by an existing regulator with a
proven track record of experience, expertise and credibility. We think that
the best fit for this role is Ofcom, both in terms of policy alignment and
organisational experience - for instance, in their existing work, Ofcom
already takes the risk-based approach that we expect the online harms
regulator will need to employ.
Transparency
13. Effective transparency reporting will help ensure that content removal is
well-founded and freedom of expression is protected. In particular,
increasing transparency around the reasons behind, and prevalence of,
content removal may address concerns about some companies’ existing
processes for removing content. Companies’ existing processes have in
some cases been criticised for being opaque and hard to challenge.
14. The government is committed to ensuring that conversations about this
policy are ongoing, and that stakeholders are being engaged to mitigate
concerns. In order to achieve this, we have recently established a multi-
stakeholder Transparency Working Group chaired by the Minister for Digital
and Broadband which includes representation from all sides of the debate,
including from industry and civil society. This group will feed into the
government’s transparency report, which was announced in the Online
Harms White Paper and which we intend to publish in the coming months.
15. Some stakeholders expressed concerns about a potential ‘one size fits
all’ approach to transparency, and the material costs for companies
associated with reporting. In line with the overarching principles of the
regulatory framework, the reporting requirements that a company may have
to comply with will also vary in proportion with the type of service that is
being provided, and the risk factors involved. To maintain a proportionate
and risk-based approach, the regulator will apply minimum thresholds in
determining the level of detail that an in-scope business would need to
provide in its transparency reporting, or whether it would need to produce
reports at all.
Ensuring that the regulator acts proportionately
16. The consideration of freedom of expression is at the heart of our policy
development, and we will ensure that appropriate safeguards are included
throughout the legislation. By taking action to address harmful online
behaviours, we are confident that our approach will support more people to
enjoy their right to freedom of expression and participate in online
discussions.
17. At the same time, we also remain confident that proposals will not place
an undue burden on business. Companies will be expected to take
reasonable and proportionate steps to protect users. This will vary according
to the organisation’s associated risk, first and foremost, size and the
resources available to it, as well as by the risk associated with the service
provided. To ensure clarity about how the duty of care could be fulfilled, we
will ensure there is sufficient clarity in the regulation and codes of practice
about the applicable expectations on business, including where businesses
are exempt from certain requirements due to their size or risk.
18. This will help companies to comply with the legislation, and to feel
confident that they have done so appropriately.
Enforcement
19. We recognise the importance of the regulator having a range of
enforcement powers that it uses in a fair, proportionate and transparent
way. It is equally essential that company executives are sufficiently
incentivised to take online safety seriously and that the regulator can take
action when they fail to do so. We are considering the responses to the
consultation on senior management liability and business disruption
measures and will set out our final policy position in the Spring.
Protection of children
20. Under our proposals we expect companies to use a proportionate range
of tools including age assurance, and age verification technologies to
prevent children from accessing age-inappropriate content and to protect
them from other harms. This would achieve our objective of protecting
children from online pornography, and would also fulfil the aims of the
Digital Economy Act.
Next steps
1. Online Harms is a key legislative priority for this government, and we have
a comprehensive programme of work planned to ensure that we keep
momentum until legislation is introduced as soon as parliamentary time
allows. As mentioned above, this is an iterative step as we consider how best
to approach this complex and important issue. We will continue to engage
closely with industry and civil society as we finalise the remaining policy.
While preparation of legislation continues, and in addition to the full
response to be published in the spring, we are developing other wider
measures in order to ensure progress now on online safety. These will
include:
Interim codes of practice
2. The government expects companies to take action now to tackle harmful
content or activity on their services. For those harms where there is a risk to
national security or to the safety of children, the government is working with
law enforcement and other relevant bodies to produce interim codes of
practice.
3. The interim codes of practice will provide guidance to companies on how
to tackle online terrorist and Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (CSEA)
content and activity. The codes will be voluntary but are intended to bridge
the gap until the regulator becomes operational, given the seriousness of
these harms. We are continuing to engage with key stakeholders in the
development of the codes to ensure that they are effective. We will publish
these interim codes of practice in the coming months.
Government transparency report
4. The Online Harms White Paper committed the government to producing
its first annual transparency report. We intend to publish this report in the
next few months. The report will be informed by discussions at a multi-
stakeholder Transparency Working Group chaired by the Minister for Digital
and Broadband.
Non-legislative measures
5. The White Paper made clear that all users should have the tools and
resources available to manage their own online safety, and that of others in
their care. It committed the government to developing a media literacy
strategy and we announced in the government’s response to the Cairncross
Review that the strategy would be published in summer 2020. The media
literacy strategy will ensure a coordinated and strategic approach to online
media literacy education and awareness for children, young people and
adults. It will aim to support citizens as users in managing their privacy
settings and their online footprint, thinking critically about the things they
come across online (disinformation, catfishing etc), and how the terms of
service and moderating processes can be used to report harmful content.
We will publish this in the summer of 2020.
6. We are keen to continue to work in partnership with tech companies and
wider stakeholders to refine our approach, and to work on collaborative
solutions, especially looking at how we can use technology to tackle these
issues. Industries such as the safety tech sector are central to the
government’s aim to promote innovation and develop a flourishing tech
industry that also delivers technological solutions to meet regulatory
requirements. To that end, we can also announce the upcoming publication
of a full report into the safety technology ecosystem, which will identify
opportunities for increasing competition and quality within the sector.
Wider regulation and governance of the digital
landscape
7. As well as delivering on our commitments set out in the Online Harms
White Paper, the government is undertaking an ambitious programme of
wider work on how we govern digital technologies to unlock the huge
opportunities presented by digital technologies whilst minimising the risks.
Work on electoral integrity and related online transparency issues is being
taken forward as part of the Defending Democracy programme together
with the Cabinet Office.
8. We want the wider institutional landscape for digital technologies to be
future-proof and fit for the digital age. As a result, over the coming months
we will engage experts, regulators, industry, civil society and the general
public to ensure our overarching regulatory regime for digital technologies is
fully coherent, efficient, and effective.
Chapter one: Detailed findings from
the consultation
1. The next sections cover:
Chapter One: Methodology of the written consultation and engagement
with stakeholders across industry, civil society, international partners and
user groups
Chapter Two: Responses on the regulatory framework (ie scope, user
redress, industry transparency, enforcement options and appeals)
Chapter Three: Responses on the proposals for the independent
regulator, regulatory accountability and funding models
Chapter Four: Responses to the non-legislative measures: the
opportunities and challenges around technological innovation, safety by
design, child online safety and education and awareness
Methodology - public consultation
2. Following the White Paper’s publication, we undertook a formal 12-week
public written consultation, complemented by an extensive programme of
stakeholder engagement. The written consultation took place between April
and July 2019, and included 18 questions on aspects of the government’s
plans for regulation and tackling online harms. In total, we gathered 2,439
responses from across academia, civil society, industry and the general
public. The face-to-face stakeholder engagement enabled a constructive
dialogue with key stakeholders, and those groups that may have been
underrepresented in the written consultation.
Written consultation
3. We gathered written consultation responses via an online portal, email
and post, both from organisations and from members of the public. Not all
respondents engaged with every question - and indeed the response rate
dropped throughout the questions. Of the 18 questions, 6 were closed
questions with predefined response options on the online portal, allowing us
to provide statistics for the responses to these questions for those who
responded via the portal. These statistics, therefore, represent 63% of all
responses (69% of all individuals and 32% of all organisations), and do not
represent the major organisational respondents.
4. The remainder of the questions invited free text qualitative responses and
each response was individually analysed. The response summaries below
include the key themes and issues highlighted across all responses, but do
not include statistics due to the nature of these questions.
5. A notable number of individual respondents to the written consultation
disagreed with the overall proposals set out in the White Paper. Those
respondents often seemed not to engage with the substance of questions
on the specific proposals, but instead reiterated a general disagreement
with the overall approach. This was most notable in those questions on
regulatory advice, proportionality, the identity and funding of the regulator,
















innovation and safety by design, which seemed to attract a relatively large
amount of confusion in responses. For these respondents, it was therefore
difficult to delineate between an objection to the overall regime and an
objection to the specific proposal within the question.
Profile of respondents
6. In total we received 1,531 online responses and 908 responses via email.
84% of these responses were from individuals and 16% from organisations
(including tech sector, civil society, charities etc).
7. We collected demographic information for just over 90% of individuals
who responded via the online portal, covering 58% of all responses:
Age: The largest proportions of responses were from those aged 45-54
(21%) and 55-64 (17%), followed by those aged 35-44 (16%) and 25-34
(15%). Respondents aged 18-24 and over 65 each made up 13% of the
sample while 5% were under 18
Gender: Almost three quarters (72%) of respondents identified as male,
with around a quarter (24%) female and 4% identified as “other”
Ethnicity: A little under two thirds (60%) of respondents identified as
“White British/English/Welsh/Scottish/Northern Irish”. Followed by 11%
“White: Any other background”, 3% “asian”, 2% “mixed/multiple ethnic
groups” and “Black/African/Caribbean background” respectively. Fewer
than 1% identified as “Arab”, 13% selected “other” and 9% preferred not
to say
Disability: Just over one in ten (11%) consider themselves as disabled
under the Equality Act 2010, 75% do not and 14% preferred not to say.
8. As these demographics indicate, this sample, as with all written
consultation samples, may not be representative of public opinion as some
key groups are over- or under-represented.
9. A number of ‘campaigns’ were organised in response to the consultation
from three sources: Samaritans, Open Rights Group, and Hacked Off. These
responses were either identical or very similar and were submitted through
central coordination. These responses were analysed and included in the
same way as all other responses.
Engagement
10. Over the 12 week period we held 100 meetings, which supported the
written consultation. This engagement enabled detailed conversations with
a wide range of stakeholders and ensured we heard the views of important
groups. Our engagement reflected the range of organisations that may be in
scope of the online harms regulatory framework, including tech
organisations, the games industry and retail. We also engaged with
academia, regulators and civil society. Furthermore, we consulted the
devolved administrations and discussed the policy in international multi-
stakeholder fora and with international partners.
11. We recognise that some abuse or content which targets users based on
actual or perceived protected characteristics under the Equality Act 2010
means that some people face disproportionately negative experiences
online. In line with this, during the consultation period we conducted
workshops with groups representing users with various protected
characteristics. This included engaging with a range of user groups
representing those who are likely to be disportionately affected by online
harms, such as the LGBTQ+ community; survivors of abuse and violence;
disabled users; mental health organisations; religious groups; children,
parents and child safety organisations. This engagement ensured groups
were able to feed back expert knowledge on specific issues faced by the
users they represent.
12. Engagement included a series of thematic workshops to consult on the
core White Paper policies. These workshops focused on: the scope of
regulation; transparency; enforcement powers; technology as a solution;
safety by design; the regulator; user complaints; media literacy and
education. Other meetings included 17 ministerial engagements, ‘deepdive’
sessions with major technology companies, and roundtable meetings with
industry associations. We also engaged stakeholders on specific, key issues
raised following the White Paper’s release, including the regulation of the
press and freedom of expression, and the approach to the interim codes of
practice on terrorist content and child sexual exploitation and abuse.
Summary of response findings:
13. The key themes from responses to the consultation and our engagement
were:
The White Paper stated, on the activities and organisations in scope, that
the regulatory framework will apply to online providers that supply
services or tools which allow, enable or facilitate users to share or
discover user-generated content or interact with each other online.
Respondents welcomed the targeted, proportionate and risk based
approach that the regulator is expected to take. Responses also
highlighted the need to ensure that proposals remain flexible and able to
respond as technology develops in the future. Companies and
stakeholders, however, asked for more detail on the breadth of both
services and harms in scope. Responses focused on ensuring that
freedom of expression is protected.
The White Paper made clear that under the new duty of care, companies
will need to ensure they have user redress mechanisms in place. This
would mean that companies need to have effective, accessible
complaints and reporting mechanisms for users to raise concerns about
specific pieces of harmful content or activity and seek redress. The White
Paper also highlighted a role for designated bodies to make ‘super
complaints’ to the regulator to defend the needs of users. Respondents
welcomed this, and highlighted the importance of ensuring that
companies have effective reporting mechanisms for harmful content,
accessible to all users. Organisations showed stronger support for the
proposals for super-complaints than individuals did. Broadly, respondents
requested more guidance on how a super-complaints function could work,
and how it could take into account accountability and transparency
mechanisms.
On transparency, the White Paper set out that companies in scope will be
required to issue annual transparency reports. Respondents to the
consultation as well as the stakeholders who were engaged highlighted
the importance of transparency, both in terms of reporting processes and
moderation practices. They see this as being central in holding companies
accountable for enforcement of their own standards. Industry
respondents suggested that transparency requirements should be
proportionate – noting that a ‘one size fits all’ approach was unlikely to be
effective and could be costly to implement for smaller companies.
The White Paper set out that the regulator will have an escalating range of
powers to take enforcement action against companies that fail to fulfil
their duty of care - including notices and warnings, fines, business
disruption measures, but also senior manager liability, and Internet
Service Provider (ISP) blocking in the most egregious cases. Respondents
to the consultation as well as the stakeholders who were engaged
recognised the role for a tiered enforcement structure, ensuring that
enforcement powers are used fairly and proportionately. Civil society
groups overall expressed support for firm enforcement actions in cases of
non-compliance. Industry and rights groups expressed some concerns
about the impact of some of the measures on the UK’s attractiveness to
the tech sector and on freedom of expression. They sought further clarity
on the intervention and escalation structure, including the grounds for
enforcement. They want the regulator to support compliance with the
regime in the first instance.
The White Paper proposed that companies have nominated
representatives in the UK, to assist the regulator in taking enforcement
action against companies based overseas. Respondents acknowledged
that this system would support the effectiveness of the proposed
legislation, however concerns were raised about the potential impact on
smaller businesses.
The White Paper set out that the regulator will offer regulatory advice to
companies on reasonable expectations for compliance, based on both the
severity and scale of the harm, the age of their users and the size of the
company and resources available to it. Respondents welcomed this. The
main suggestions provided were on opportunities for the regulator to
provide clarity on any specific standards and thresholds, alongside
guidelines and expert advice on how organisations could comply.
The White Paper acknowledged that online harms can materialise via
private communications services, and committed to setting out a
differentiated framework for harm over private communications.
Responses across stakeholders recognised the balance between taking
appropriate action to address the serious harms, such as child grooming,
that can be initiated and escalate from private forums and ensuring
appropriate protections for users’ privacy. Most companies and
organisations agreed that expectations of private services to tackle harm
should be greater, firstly where content and activity is illegal, and
secondly where children are involved. Most respondents opposed the
inclusion of private communication services in scope of regulation.
However, some responses - both from individuals and organisations
acknowledged that abuse, harassment and some of the most serious
illegal activity occur in private spaces, like closed community forums and
chat rooms. These responses expressed support for the principle that
platforms should be responsible for their users’ safety in private channels.
The White Paper set out that there must be an appeals mechanism for
companies and others to challenge against a decision by the regulator
when appropriate. Responses showed broad support for a mechanism
allowing appeals against enforcement action by the regulator. Companies
suggested that appeals mechanisms should be quick and affordable,
focussed on the merits of the action taken and that administrative
processes should be as streamlined as possible.
The White Paper stated that proportionality would be central to
enforcement decisions by the regulator. Respondents welcomed the
suggestion that the compliance systems could be designed similarly to
current models in, for example, the finance sector. Specifically, they
expressed support for options allowing companies to self-assess whether
their services are in scope, and enabling members of the public to raise
concerns with the regulator where a company is not complying.
The White Paper did not express a specific preference for the identity of
the regulator. Most of the stakeholders we engaged with had no particular
preference. Responses were supportive of a new body or of extending the
duties of an existing regulator. Some feared that the latter option could
prove overwhelming for an existing body and thus instead voiced support
for a transitional or temporary body.
The White Paper set out that the regulator will be cost-neutral, and that
for funding it would recoup costs via charges or a levy on companies in
scope. Companies who responded to the consultation viewed the
application of a charge with concern, citing worries around potential
double or disproportionate costs to certain services and exemption for
others.
The White Paper proposed a duty on the regulator to lay an annual report
and accounts before Parliament and provide Parliament with information
as and when requested for accountability. All groups generally expressed
support for Parliament to have a defined oversight role over the regulator
in order to hold it to account, maintain independence from government
and build public trust and hold industry confidence.
The White Paper committed to developing a framework on safety by
design and innovation, to make it easier for start-ups and small businesses
to embed safety in their products. Stakeholders expressed broad
agreement and recognition that safety is improved when organisations
build in user-safety at the design and development stage of their online
services. They also emphasised that machine learning solutions require
extensive data and were supportive of the ‘regulatory sandbox’ model (i.e.
allowing businesses to test innovations in a controlled environment).
The White Paper committed to make the UK the safest place to be online,
having key regard for child online safety. Respondents welcomed this, and
one of the key themes of our engagement was parents’ concerns about
the safety of their children online. In particular, although parents felt that
they know their children best and are therefore usually the best placed to
tailor standard advice for them, they also agreed on the need for more
advice and education on how to be online safely.
The White Paper recognised that users want to be empowered to manage
their safety online, and that the regulator should consider education and
awareness to support this. Throughout our engagement, digital education
and awareness were key recurring themes. Many felt that the regulator
could have an important role in creating a framework for evaluating the
impact of existing education and awareness activity in their space. Others
recognised that there could be a role for the regulator or for government
in supporting the most vulnerable children and disseminating alerts about
emerging online threats for young people.
Chapter two: Regulatory framework
1. The Online Harms White Paper set out the intention to bring in a new duty
of care on companies towards their users, with an independent regulator to
oversee this framework. The approach will be proportionate and risk-based
with the duty of care designed to ensure companies have appropriate
systems and processes in place to improve the safety of their users.
2. The White Paper stated that the regulatory framework will apply to online
providers that supply services or tools which allow, enable or facilitate users
to share or discover user-generated content, or to interact with each other
online. The government will set the parameters for the regulatory
framework, including specifying which services are in scope of the regime,
the requirements put upon them, user redress mechanisms and the
enforcement powers of the regulator.
3. The consultation responses indicated that some respondents were
concerned that the proposals could impact freedom of expression online.
We recognise the critical importance of freedom of expression, and an
overarching principle of the regulation of online harms is to protect users’
rights online, including the rights of children and freedom of expression. In
fact, the new regulatory framework will not require the removal of specific
pieces of legal content. Instead, it will focus on the wider systems and
processes that platforms have in place to deal with online harms, while
maintaining a proportionate and risk-based approach.
4. To ensure protections for freedom of expression, regulation will establish
differentiated expectations on companies for illegal content and activity,
versus conduct that may not be illegal but has the potential to cause harm,
such as online bullying, intimidation in public life, or self-harm and suicide
imagery.
5. In-scope services will need to ensure that illegal content is removed
expeditiously and that the risk of it appearing is minimised by effective
systems. Reflecting the threat to national security and the physical safety of
children, companies will be required to take particularly robust action to
tackle terrorist content and online child sexual exploitation and abuse.
6. Companies will be able to decide what type of legal content or behaviour
is acceptable on their services. They will need to set this out in clear and
accessible terms and conditions and enforce these effectively, consistently
and transparently.
7. We do not expect there to be a code of practice for each category of
harmful content. We recognise that this would pose an unreasonable
regulatory burden on in-scope services. However, we will publish interim
codes of practice in the coming months to provide guidance for companies
on how to tackle online terrorist and CSEA content and activity. The codes
will be voluntary but are intended to bridge the gap and incentivise
companies to take early action prior to the regulator becoming operational,
thus continuing to promote behaviour change from industry on the most
serious online harms. We are continuing to engage with key stakeholders in
the development of the codes to ensure that they are effective.
8. We will expect the regulator to set expectations around imagery that may
not be visibly illegal, but is linked to child sexual exploitation and abuse, for
example, a series of images, some of which were taken prior to or after the
act of abuse itself. We will consider further how to address this issue through
the duty of care.
9. The legislation will only apply to companies that provide services which
facilitate the sharing of user generated content or user interactions, for
example through comments, forums or video sharing. Only a very small
proportion of UK businesses (estimated to account for less than 5%) fit
within that definition. To ensure clarity, guidance would be provided to help
businesses understand whether or not the services they provide would fall
into the scope of the regulation.
10. To be in scope, a business’s own website would need to provide
functionalities that enable sharing of user generated content or user
interactions. We will introduce this legislation proportionately. We will pay
particular attention to minimising the regulatory burden on small businesses
and where there is a lower risk of harm occurring.
11. We have listened to and taken into account feedback from industry
stakeholders. It is clear that business-to-business services have very limited
opportunities to prevent harm occurring to individuals and as such remain
out of scope of the Duty of Care.
12. We are continuing the work on the final details of the organisations in
scope, to ensure proportionality and effective implementation of our
proposals. We will produce an impact assessment to accompany legislation
which will take into account burdens to businesses.
Activities and organisations in scope
Are proposals for the online platforms and services in scope of the
regulatory framework a suitable basis for an effective and
proportionate approach?
Engagement
13. Throughout our engagement, organisations expressed support for the
targeted, proportionate, and risk-based approach for the regulator. Many
parties expressed a need for clarity as the proposals develop around the kind
of organisation and platforms that would be in scope.
14. The tech industry, while broadly supportive, emphasised the importance
of providing clear definitions of the companies and harms in scope, in
particular addressing what is meant by ‘user generated content’. A number
of organisations suggested that business to business (B2B) services should
not be in scope, as their view was that there was a lower risk that the harms
covered in the White Paper would develop on such platforms. Press freedom
organisations and media actors also expressed the view that journalistic
content should not be in scope, to protect freedom of expression and in
accordance with established conventions of press regulation.
15. Civil society organisations representing disadvantaged groups
demonstrated strong support for the proposals and emphasised the
importance of including any provider of a platform or service made available
to users in the UK within the scope of the regulation. Women’s groups ,
LGBT+, disability, and religious groups cited larger social media companies
most frequently as the platforms of greatest concern, but were also
concerned about smaller platforms, chat rooms, and anonymous apps,
which they believe can easily be infiltrated for harm. A number of
organisations suggested that economic harms (for instance, fraud) should
be in scope. While the White Paper was clear that the list of harms provided
was not intended to be exhaustive or definitive, a number of organisations
suggested specific harms, for example misogyny. Many civil society
organisations also raised concerns about the inclusion of harms which are
harder to identify, such as disinformation, citing concerns of the impact this
could have on freedom of expression.
Written consultation
16. Just over half of respondents to the written consultation answered this
question. Responses which expressed support for the proposed platforms
and activities in scope called on the government to increase education and
public awareness of online harms. Responses also stressed the need to
ensure that the proposals remain flexible and able to change as technology
develops in the future, and that they maintain a special focus on young
people and children.
17. Many respondents expressed concerns around the potential for the
scope of the regulator to be too broad or for it to have an adverse impact on
freedom of expression. Many of these respondents, therefore, called for
further clarification of services and harms in scope. Some respondents also
raised concerns that the proposals would have disproportionate impacts on
specific organisations or, on the other hand, that they may not go far
enough.
A systems based approach to online safety
The White Paper outlined a systems based approach:
The duty of care is designed to ensure companies have
appropriate systems and processes in place to improve the safety
of their users.
The focus on robust processes and systems rather than individual
pieces of content means it will remain effective even as new harms
emerge. It will also ensure that service providers develop, clearly
communicate and enforce their own thresholds for harmful but
legal content.
Of course, companies will be required to take particularly robust
action to tackle terrorist content and online Child Sexual
Exploitation and Abuse. The new regulatory framework will not
remove companies’ existing duty to remove illegal content.
18. When broken down, the responses from organisations and members of
the public differed in regard to the main perceived issues. For instance,
concerns for freedom of expression were significantly more prevalent
amongst individual respondents than amongst organisations. Instead,
organisations reported a higher concern around the overreach of scope and
a need for further clarity.
19. In general, organisations were more supportive of regulation when
compared to public respondents. The tech sector and civil society groups
expressed a level of support for the activities listed in scope, with many
agreeing that focus should be on risk of harm, and that the regulator should
take a proportionate approach to the companies in scope according to their
risk profile.
20. At the same time, almost all industry respondents asked for greater
clarity about definitions of harms, and highlighted the subjectivity inherent
in identifying many of the harms, especially those which are legal. The
majority of respondents objected to the latter being in scope.
21. Regarding harms in scope, several respondents stated that the 23 harms
listed in the White Paper were overly broad and argued that too many codes
of practice would cause confusion, duplication, and potentially, an over-
reliance on removal of content by risk-averse companies. We do not expect
there to be a code of practice for each category of harmful content, however,
as set out above we intend to publish interim codes of practice on how to
tackle online terrorist and Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (CSEA)
content and activity in the coming months.
22. Specific groups echoed many of the general points raised in the written
consultation, as well as suggesting specific services for inclusion in scope.
For example, counter-extremism and religious groups noted the need for
clarity to ensure that harms can properly be protected against and to
minimise risks to constraining free expression. A common perspective
among children’s charities was that gaming should be in scope.
23. Across responses and engagement, there was broad support for the
proposed targeted, proportionate and risk-based approach that the
regulator is expected to take. Responses also highlighted the need to
ensure that proposals remain flexible and able to respond as technology
develops in the future. However, companies and stakeholders wanted more
detail on the breadth of both services and harms in scope. There was also a
consistent focus on ensuring that freedom of expression was protected.
Respondents welcomed the focus on protecting vulnerable users, including
young people and children, and a number of respondents also suggested
that further work should be done to increase education and public
awareness of online harms.
User redress
24. The White Paper recognised that companies’ claims of having a strong
track record on online safety are often at odds with users’ reported
experiences. The White Paper made clear that, under the new duty of care,
government expects companies to ensure they have effective, accessible
complaints and reporting mechanisms for users to raise concerns about
specific pieces of harmful content or activity and seek redress, or to raise
wider concerns that the company has breached its duty of care. The White
Paper also highlighted a role for designated bodies to make ‘super
complaints’ to the regulator to defend the needs of users.
25. The regulator will have oversight of these processes, including through
transparency information about the volume and outcome of complaints, and
the power to require improvements where necessary. The regulator will be
focused on oversight of complaints processes, it will not make decisions on
individual pieces of content.
26. Recognising concerns about freedom of expression, while the regulator
will not investigate or adjudicate on individual complaints, companies will be
required to have effective and proportionate user redress mechanisms which
will enable users to report harmful content and to challenge content
takedown where necessary. This will give users clearer, more effective and
more accessible avenues to question content takedown, which is an
important safeguard for the right to freedom of expression. These processes
will need to be transparent, in line with terms and conditions, and
consistently applied.
Should designated bodies be able to bring super complaints to the
regulator in specific and clearly evidenced circumstances? If your
answer is yes, in what circumstances should this happen?
What, if any, other measures should the government consider for
users who wish to raise concerns about specific pieces of harmful
content or activity, and/or breaches of the duty of care?
Engagement
27. While the written consultation did not directly ask about internal
company processes, many organisations shared their views in written
responses and in supporting stakeholder engagement. They overwhelmingly
agreed that companies should have effective and accessible mechanisms for
reporting harmful content and felt that current processes often fell short.
They agreed that this process should start with reports directly to the
platform. Some respondents, including disability and children’s advocates,
noted the importance of making these mechanisms accessible and
prominent for all users, as they are often not easy to find on websites. Some
also noted the importance of companies providing explanations to users
whose content is removed, in order to protect rights and to help all users
understand what is acceptable on different platforms. Some respondents
also argued for a more standardised approach to reporting complaints to
enable comparison and analysis.
28. A number of organisations highlighted concerns about a potential risk
that the regulator would become the arbiter of what is considered harmful
and the potential impact of this on freedom of expression.
29. A recurrent theme in organisational responses was that more effective
complaints and reporting processes must also be accompanied by
education and awareness-raising by companies and other stakeholders,
including on people’s rights and responsibilities and the avenues available to
them to raise concerns. Nevertheless, as the section summarising
responses to the question of how users should be educated shows, there
was no consensus on which body or bodies should be responsible for
educating users.
30. We stated that we do not envisage a role for the regulator itself in
determining disputes between individuals and companies. Several
organisations agreed with this, noting that it would not be feasible for the
regulator to look into individual complaints and that it could risk users’
rights to freedom of expression. Other respondents instead suggested that
the regulator should have powers to look at specific cases, for example
those which are particularly high-profile or serious.
Written consultation
31. The White Paper written consultation included a specific question on
whether legislative provision should be made for designated bodies to bring
‘super-complaints’ to the regulator for consideration, in specific and clearly
evidenced circumstances. 88% of respondents online answered this
question, of whom almost a third (32%) agreed with the proposal and
almost half (49%) disagreed. The remainder (19%) said they did not know.
Figure 1: Should designated bodies be able to bring super complaints to the
regulator in specific and clearly evidenced circumstances? Note: ​Online
portal respondents only.
32. When considering organisational responses only, the proportion of
respondents who agreed with the proposal rises to almost two-thirds (63%).
The majority of stakeholders with whom we engaged also supported super-
complaints. Many noted that super-complaints could prove particularly
useful for tackling issues regarding legal harms, which cannot be addressed
through law enforcement agency routes. Groups representing religious
users felt that super-complaints could provide an effective means to address
online discrimination and abuse. Disability and children’s advocacy groups,
as well as some academics, were especially supportive, noting that super-
complaints would allow for people who might not otherwise raise concerns
or report issues to be heard and to have their concerns alerted to the
regulator.
33. Several organisational respondents sought further clarity on how a
super-complaints function would work in practice, and others (including
regulators with super-complaint functions) noted that they are not normally
intended to deliver direct redress to individuals. Women’s charities
expressed support, but noted that other mechanisms may be necessary, for
example in the case of low-level continuous harassment, which causes
distress through its repetitiveness rather than its content. Some
respondents also noted that a super-complaints function would only be
effective if it was transparent and backed up by accountability mechanisms.
34. For those answering ‘yes’, we asked a further question on the
circumstances under which super complaints should be admissible. Among
organisational respondents, there was a high level of agreement that super-
complaints should be permitted when there has been a large number of
complaints or where there is evidence of clear abuses of company policy or
standards. However , there was little consensus on what the criteria would
look like in practice. There were relatively few individual responses to this
question, as individuals responding online were only shown the question if
they had responded ‘yes’ to part one. Of those individuals who did respond,
there was little consensus, although in general individuals were more
supportive than organisations of super-complaints regarding specific pieces
of content.
35. We also consulted on other measures for users who wish to raise
concerns about specific pieces of harmful content or activity, and/or
breaches of the duty of care. Less than two fifths of respondents answered
this question, and while the majority of responses expressed general
disagreement with the proposals, a significant number expressed support
and proposed options for users to raise concerns.
36. Many responses, particularly from organisations, argued for an
independent review mechanism, such as an ombudsman, although no-one
gave further detail on how this could work and some organisations raised
concerns about the feasibility and desirability of an ombudsman. Other
proposals included the possibility for automatic suspensions of reported
posts on request by regulator or individuals.
37. While many individual respondents raised concerns about freedom of
expression and how the envisaged user redress framework will be
implemented in practice, there was a general consensus amongst
organisations about the need for effective and accessible mechanisms for
users to seek redress, and in favour of the measures we proposed.
Protecting users’ rights online
The White Paper stressed that users should receive timely, clear and
transparent responses to their complaints of harmful content and
committed to protecting their rights.
Companies covered by the regulator will be required to have an
effective, proportionate, easy-to-access complaints process,
allowing users to raise concerns about harmful content or activity,
or that the company has breached its duty of care.
The regulator will set minimum standards for these processes, so
that users will know how they can raise a complaint, how long it
will take a company to investigate, and what response they can
expect.
We do not envisage a role for the regulator itself in determining
disputes between individuals and companies, but where users
raise concerns with the regulator, it will be able to use this
information as part of its consideration of whether a company may
have breached duty of care.
38. The importance of ensuring that companies should have effective
reporting mechanisms for harmful content, accessible to all users, was
highlighted here. There was stronger support for the proposals for super-
complaints from organisations responding than from individuals, with
organisations highlighting that super-complaints could provide particularly
useful for addressing legal-but-harmful content prevalent on some
platforms. Broadly, respondents requested more support on how a super-
complaints function could work, and how it could take into account
accountability and transparency mechanisms. A number of respondents
suggested a role for an independent review mechanism.
Transparency
39. As set out in the White Paper, the government has committed to giving
the regulator the power to require annual transparency reports from
companies in scope. These reports would, for example, outline the
prevalence of harmful content on their platforms, and what measures are
being taken to address these.
40. The regulator would publish these reports online to support users and
parents in making informed decisions about internet use. The regulator
would also have powers to require additional information from companies to
inform its oversight or enforcement activity, and to establish requirements
to disclose information.
41. Effective transparency reporting will help ensure that content removal is
well-founded and freedom of expression is protected. In particular,
increasing transparency around the reasons behind, and prevalence of,
content removal may address concerns about some companies’ existing
processes for removing content. Companies’ existing processes have in
some cases been criticised for being opaque and hard to challenge.
42. In addition, as part of the transparency reporting framework, the
regulator will encourage companies to share anonymised information with
independent researchers, and ensure companies make relevant information
available.
43. The government is committed to ensuring that conversations about this
policy are ongoing, and that stakeholders are being engaged to mitigate
concerns. In order to achieve this, we have recently established a multi-
stakeholder Transparency Working Group chaired by the Minister for Digital
and Broadband, which includes representation from all sides of the debate,
including civil society members as well as industry. This group will feed into
the government’s transparency report, which was announced in the Online
Harms White Paper and which we intend to publish in the coming months.
44. Some stakeholders expressed concerns about a potential ‘one size fits
all’ approach to transparency, and the material costs for companies
associated with reporting. The regulatory framework is designed to be
proportionate, and so will set out minimum thresholds that a company
would need to meet before reporting requirements would apply. In line with
the overarching principles of the regulatory framework, the reporting
requirements that a company may have to comply with will also vary in
proportion with the type of service that is being provided, and the risk
factors involved.
The government has committed to Annual Transparency Reporting.
Beyond the measures set out in this White Paper, should the
government do more to build a culture of transparency, trust and
accountability across industry and, if so, what?
Engagement
45. Transparency has been a key theme discussed with a range of
organisations and user groups. A wide variety of stakeholders, including
rights groups and tech companies, supported such measures and agreed
that increased transparency is needed. Children’s charities, LGBT+
organisations and religious groups especially welcomed the framework’s
focus on transparency - both in terms of reporting processes and moderation
practices for the purpose of holding companies accountable to their own
standards. Freedom of expression groups were similarly supportive of
greater transparency and accountability but were keen to emphasise that
transparency reporting should promote users’ rights and should contain
information about how companies uphold users’ right to freedom of
expression online.
46. The importance of proportionality in relation to the transparency
requirements emerged as a key point. Furthermore, a number of companies
noted that, given the variation between companies, a ‘one size fits all
approach’ was unlikely to be effective.
Written consultation
47. The written consultation asked people whether, beyond the measures
set out in the White Paper, the government should do more to build a culture
of transparency, trust and accountability across industry and, if so, what?
90% of online respondents answered this closed question. Of these, there
was little difference between those who agreed the government should do
more and those who disagreed (41% and 39% respectively). Almost a fifth
(19%) said they didn’t know.
Figure 2: The government has committed to Annual Transparency Reporting.
Beyond the measures set out in this White Paper, should the government do
more to build a culture of transparency, trust and accountability across
industry? Note: ​Online portal respondents only.
48. When broken down, the responses from organisations and members of
the public differ, with 72% of organisations agreeing that the government
should do more, compared to only 39% of individuals.
49. Those who agreed that the government should do more provided
answers for how and what measures could go beyond the White Paper
proposals to increase transparency. A large proportion of responses
suggested this could be done through requiring increased clarity and detail
of reporting. Many responses also suggested that engagement with
international partners would help to promote a culture of transparency and
trust.
50. In particular, amongst organisations, civil society groups were
considerably more supportive of the proposals advanced in the White Paper
around transparency, which they saw as a crucial mechanism to increase
companies’ accountability and foster positive relationships with the
regulator. While the technology sector was also overall broadly supportive of
transparency, there was less consensus about the format the reporting
should take. Some small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) highlighted
resource and capability challenges associated with collecting or reporting
certain types of information. Other respondents, including dating sites and
retailers, echoed this concern, stating that transparency reporting might be
overly onerous on them should it require significant re-engineering of their
given product or service if it had not been designed to gather certain types of
data. Generally, respondents expressed support for flexibility over rigid
guidelines, although, at the same time, some did acknowledge the benefit of
having structure and direction from the regulator.
51. Many responses also explicitly mentioned that reporting should be
qualitative, not just quantitative, avoiding a one size fits all approach, and
that the data reported should be clear and meaningful. Respondents also
asked that transparency reports be written in plain English and made
accessible to the public.
52. Responses from both organisations and individuals contained specific
proposals for how to increase transparency. These proposals included
requiring social media companies to show how safety features are being
improved in line with the regulator’s recommendations. Other suggestions
included: increased transparency from social media platforms on content
moderation decisions, involving the public in formulating online harms policy
and encouraging social media companies to promote their own transparency
reports to their users.
53. Responses also suggested specific focal points and metrics for the
transparency report, such as an independent review of AI/algorithms, an
attention to ‘addiction by design,’ a specific separate focus on child safety,
advertising, and finally expert medical advice.
54. Additionally, although not directly relevant to the question, many
responses took the opportunity to suggest an increase in government
transparency and that any future regulator should also be transparent.
55. Many of those who disagreed that the government should do more
asserted that government should not be involved or should be less involved.
Other responses attested that it was not possible to hold the companies in
scope to account.
56. Overall, responses to this question varied, expressing suggestions for
what government should do to increase transparency, trust and
accountability across industry, as well as some respondents expressing
concerns with an increasing government role.
Enforcement
57. The regulator will have a range of enforcement powers to take action
against companies that fail to fulfil their duty of care. This will drive rapid
remedial action, and ensure that non-compliance faces serious
consequences. The enforcement powers referenced are the power to issue
warnings, notices and substantial fines. The White Paper also included
proposals for business disruption measures - including potential for business
disruption, Internet Service provider (ISP) blocking, senior management
liability.
Should the regulator be empowered to i) disrupt business activities,
or ii) undertake ISP blocking, or iii) implement a regime for senior
management liability? What, if any, further powers should be
available to the regulator?
Engagement
58. Throughout our engagement, industry representatives ranging from
larger tech firms to start-up companies expressed a measure of support for
the tiered enforcement approach set out in the White Paper. At the same
time, they asked for further clarity on what would be considered appropriate
points for intervention and escalation, as well as what limits could be
considered reasonable for sanctions in order for these not to represent an
unacceptable business risk. Internet service provider (ISP) blocking
represented the main area of concern across discussions. Industry stated in
principle support in some cases (e.g. when websites are set up for solely
unlawful purposes), but argued that it would need to be mandated only as a
last resort following due process and underpinned by the legal framework.
59. Senior manager liability emerged as an area of concern. Discussions with
industry highlighted the risk of potential negative impacts on the
attractiveness of the UK tech sector. Further concerns emerged that this
approach may unduly penalise individuals for content often originating from
other third-parties who would not be adversely affected by the sanctions,
unless the regime proposed is able to account for these. With regard to
further powers, industry representatives felt that the regulator should fulfill
a supervisory function and look to support compliance in the first instance.
60. Civil society groups overall expressed support for firm enforcement
actions, in cases of non-compliance. Nevertheless, rights organisations
expressed concerns about risks to freedom of expression and the potential
impact of censorship associated with enforcement powers.
Written consultation




implement a regime for senior management liability
62. We also asked if any further powers should be available to the regulator.
63. This question did not receive a high response rate. Across all categories,
the majority of respondents highlighted concerns that excessive
enforcement could have a detrimental effect on both business and personal
freedoms - and risk that measures could incentivise companies to over-block
user-generated content to avoid penalties.
64. Analysis of the responses of organisations and individuals showed a
large difference in levels of support - with a significantly larger portion of
concerns coming from the individual respondents, while organisations
generally supported the proposals. This result is not surprising given the
apprehension amongst many individual respondents about how the
proposals would impact usability and personal freedoms. The creative
industries, sport sector, local government, law enforcement organisations
and children’s charities particularly expressed broad support for the majority
of enforcement mechanisms listed in the White Paper.
65. Respondents who supported the proposals took the view that the
regulator should have robust enforcement powers that are used fairly and
proportionately.
66. Respondents expressing support for the business disruption proposals
highlighted the importance of the need to ensure these powers are used
proportionately and should be an escalation from demonstrable non-
compliance and prior warnings being issued. This view was also expressed
for senior management liability. Many who welcomed it as a measure to hold
individuals to account felt it should only be used after demonstrable non-
compliance and the failure of previous measures. For ISP blocking the
common view was that it be used as a last resort. A small number of
respondents suggested additional powers, including further enforcement
measures against companies such as temporary content takedowns, and
sanctions for failing to duly protect freedom of expression.
67. Organisations raised other points of criticism. Rights groups expressed
concerns that the proposed enforcement approach may be
disproportionately punitive, and the regulator would need to demonstrate it
had met the proportionality test for freedom of expression under human
rights law. This was a particular concern for ISP blocking.
68. Although many industry members noted their opposition to ISP blocking
in general, they acknowledged that there may be circumstances in which the
exercise of such powers would be appropriate. Practically, industry
requested clear guidance and an agreed process for notifying operators
when websites are required to be blocked (or reinstated), and clarification
on the anticipated volume of websites that would be in scope.
69. From a technical perspective, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) also
noted the importance of developing the future regulation with reference to
wider technical developments such as encryption, which might undermine
the effectiveness of website blocking. Industry requested a transition period
to adjust to or implement the new regulations without the threat of severe
sanctions. Larger tech companies highlighted the implementation
challenges they may have due to the size and complexity of their systems.
70. In summary, while civil society groups overall expressed support for firm
enforcement actions, the proposals remain contentious for industry,
freedom of expression groups, and members of the public. For the
implementation of the proposed measures, respondents expressed a
preference for the regulator to begin its operations by supervising
companies and supporting compliance through advice, and that any further
enforcement measures should be used proportionately and following a clear
process.
Nominated Representative
71. Noting the particularly serious nature of some of the harms in scope and
the global nature of many online services, the White Paper proposed that the
regulator should have the power to ensure that action can be taken against
companies without a legal presence in the UK. It sets out the possibility of a
requirement for companies to nominate a UK or EEA-based representative
for these purposes, similar to the concept in the EU’s General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR).
Should the regulator have the power to require a company based
outside the UK or EEA to appoint a nominated representative in the
UK or EEA in certain circumstances?
Engagement
72. Throughout our engagement with industry, concerns of impracticality
and challenges of implementation emerged as a key theme, with SMEs
arguing that this could be excessively burdensome for them. Some proposed
other ideas, such as the establishment of an endorsement system for
companies demonstrating best practice.
Written consultation
73. Less than half of online respondents answered this question (48%), of
which almost two thirds (62%) responded“no”, followed by “yes” (27%) and
“don’t know” (11%). Respondents to the written consultation generally
disagreed that the regulator should have the power to require a company
based outside the UK or EEA to appoint a nominated UK or EEA
representative.
Figure 3: Should the regulator have the power to require a company based
outside the UK or EEA to appoint a nominated representative in the UK or
EEA in certain circumstances? Note: ​Online portal respondents only.
74. When broken down by organisations and members of the public, the
responses are contrasting, with the majority of organisations responding
“yes” (63%) as opposed to less than a quarter of individuals (24%).
Furthermore, the proportion of those that responded “don’t know” is larger
amongst organisations than members of the public (25% and 10%
respectively).
75. Across both groups, among those who agreed that the regulator should
have the power to require a UK or EEA representative, many responses
focused on this being necessary to support international consistency and
cooperation. A large proportion of these responses highlighted a need for
increased international dialogue, followed by consideration of issues such as
online harms being too complex to be regulated in a single country.
76. Responses from organisations in particular often suggested that a
representative would be necessary to enable UK legislation to be effective,
aid the implementation of regulation and making it harder for companies to
avoid complying.
77. Additionally, many responses suggested that the requirement to have a
UK or EEA representative should only apply to organisations over a certain
size or with a particular user base, echoing a theme that regulation should be
proportionate.
78. Of the majority of all respondents who disagreed with the proposed
requirement, the most common concern was around the potential negative
impact on business. Some small business respondents explicitly expressed
disagreement, feeling that this proposal would impose costs and demands
that will negatively affect them.
79. Other concerns included: potential for a negative impact on users; a lack
of effectiveness when the UK leaves the European Union; and concerns over
how it could be practically enforced.
80. Overall, it is clear that the impacts of nominated representation on
business costs and operations is a point of concern for industry, and SMEs in
particular.
Regulatory advice
81. The White Paper set out how the regulator will take a proportionate
approach, with reasonable expectations of companies dependent on both
the severity and scale of the harm, the age of their users and the size of the
company and resources available to it. The White Paper also set out the
principles of better regulation, including a commitment for the regulator to
help SMEs and start-ups to fulfill their obligations for compliance.
82. The written consultation asked how the regulator could provide advice
and support to help businesses comply with the regulatory framework,
acknowledging the potential for specific impacts to SMEs and start-ups.
What, if any, advice or support could the regulator provide to help
businesses, particularly start-ups and SMEs, comply with the
regulatory framework?
Engagement
83. Throughout our engagement with industry, the main ask was for the
regulator to provide clarity over any specific standards as a basis for the new
regulation.
Written consultation
84. Written responses provided a variety of suggestions for how the
regulator could provide support to businesses. The most common response
from both organisations and individuals was for guidelines and expert advice
on how organisations need to comply, and for a need for effective
engagement strategies.
85. Some responses made suggestions about the approach to regulation
more generally, suggesting exemptions for start-ups and SMEs and a
differentiated approach depending on the business type. Respondents also
highlighted that engagement would need to be clear on how regulation
interacts with international legal obligations. A number of responses, the
majority from individuals, also expressed disagreement with the implicit
assumption in the question that a regulator would be established, possibly
further impacted by confusion in the role of regulators amongst some
responses. A small proportion expressed that no advice or support should be
provided to help businesses.
86. Organisations particularly emphasised the need for support and advice.
SMEs and cloud service providers emphasised that they would like to see
the regulator have an open door policy with business stakeholders and begin
its operation offering advice through resources and “how-to” guides.
Similarly, other respondents advanced suggestions that the regulator offer,
and have the power to charge for, specific advice services to companies that
request detailed advice on how they can comply with the regulations.
87. It is clear that organisations, particularly SMEs, want the regulator to
provide guidance on how different services can fulfil the duty of care.
Organisations also want to be able to contact the regulator for more tailored
advice. They feel that the regulator should be able to provide advice at an
early stage of its operation.
Private communications
88. The White Paper acknowledged both the importance of privacy online
and the aim to protect UK users from harmful content or behaviour wherever
it occurs online. It noted that criminals should not be able to exploit the
online space to conduct illegal activity. The development of harmful activity
online frequently involves a combination of activity taking place on both
‘public’ and ‘private’ communication channels. For example, people
targeting children to commit serious online harms often make initial contact
with a child on public social media platforms, before moving to private
messaging services to continue the grooming process. The White Paper
consulted on what criteria should be considered in developing a definition
for ‘private’ communication services, noting the complexity of defining
‘private’ and ‘public’ in the online space.
89. Reflecting the importance of privacy, the White Paper committed to
setting out a framework that will ensure a differentiated approach for private
communication. The White Paper consulted on which channels or forums
which could be considered private should be in scope of the regulatory
framework. It asked what specific requirements might be appropriate to
apply to private channels and forums in order to tackle online harms.
In developing a definition for private communications, what criteria
should be considered?
Which channels or forums that can be considered private should be
in scope of the regulatory framework?
What specific requirements might be appropriate to apply to private
channels and forums in order to tackle online harms?
Engagement
90. We engaged with experts from academia, industry, think tanks and wider
civil society organisations on the questions of defining private
communications, the scope of the regulatory framework in relation to
private channels, and what requirements should be applied to private
channels.
91. Throughout our engagement, organisations representing vulnerable
groups expressed strong support for private communications falling in
scope of the regulatory framework. Children’s charities were particularly
insistent that community forums, chat rooms and messaging apps all need
to be in scope, providing evidence of how people targeting children to
commit serious online harms use these services to groom and abuse
children.
92. Industry representatives and some civil society groups expressed
concern that to include private channels in scope might lead platforms to
take steps that create unacceptable, negative impacts on users’ privacy.
Some civil society groups were more comfortable with online platforms
empowering users to themselves report harmful activity on private channels,
but expressed concern about more intrusive steps such as proactive
moderation of private channels. Most companies and organisations agreed
that the regulator’s expectations of companies to tackle harms on private
services should be greater where the content and activity is illegal and/or
where children are involved.
Written consultation
93. Around a third of respondents answered question 6. Organisations were
more likely to advance criteria for defining private communications than
individual respondents. A common response was that user intent and
purpose of the service should be taken into account when considering if a
communication is private.
94. Several responses from organisations stated that one-to-one phone
calls, messages, and video calls should not be included in scope and
cautioned against using the number of users as the sole indicator for
whether a communication is private. However, others state that identifying a
maximum number of people beyond which a conversation is no longer
considered private could be helpful.
95. In terms of which fora and services should be in scope, many
organisations responded “none”, and only a small proportion responded
“all”. In between these two, the other most common responses were based
on suggestions for specific activities or platforms.
96. Those who answered “none” with regard to which private services
should be in scope, when elaborating on their answer, argued that the
presence of a blocking feature on a private service, enabling users to block
content from other individuals, is sufficient for tackling harm. These
respondents argued for the need to respect user privacy and also maintained
that encrypted services be ruled out of scope.
97. Among those who expressed agreement with including private
communications in scope, a large portion of responses from organisations
mentioned specific activities and platforms to include, such as social media,
mentioned specific activities and platforms to include, such as social media,
dating, and gaming sites as well as services enabling private messaging, and
video and photo sharing. These responses identified the significance of
private communications as spaces where harms can be planned and carried
out. Some responses also expressed concern about the migration of illegal
activity - such as child grooming and the sharing of child abuse imagery - to
encrypted spaces, arguing that encrypted services should be in scope.
98. Those respondents - both organisations and individuals - who responded
‘none’ to the question of which private services should be in scope also
tended to answer ‘none’ to the question of which requirements should be
applied to private services.
99. Those respondents who agreed that some private communication
services should be in scope provided a range of answers to the question of
which requirements should be applied to private services. These included
suggestions of requirements which might limit the impact on users’ privacy.
For example, responses suggested that platforms should offer reporting
mechanisms allowing users to report abusive or offensive content sent to
them privately - a process, which would not require companies to monitor
private messages for harm.
100. In conclusion, overall respondents opposed the inclusion of private
communication services in scope of regulation. However, there was
acknowledgement in some responses - both from individuals and
organisations - that abuse, and harassment and some of the most serious
illegal activity occur in private spaces, like closed community forums and
chat rooms. These responses expressed support for the principle that
platforms should be responsible for their users’ safety in private channels.
Appeals
101. The White Paper acknowledged that companies and others must have
confidence that the regulator is acting fairly and within its powers. As with
other regulatory systems, companies will have the ability to seek a judicial
review of the regulator’s decisions through the High Court. The White Paper
also considered other avenues of appeal and asked whether there should be
a further statutory mechanism for companies to appeal against a decision of
the regulator. We gave the example of section 192-196 of the
Communications Act 2003, through which there is the ability to appeal
against an Ofcom decision via the Competition Appeal Tribunal.
In addition to judicial review should there be a statutory mechanism
for companies to appeal against a decision of the regulator, as exists
in relation to Ofcom under sections 192-196 of the Communications
Act 2003?
If your answer to question 14 is ‘yes’, in what circumstances should
companies be able to use this statutory mechanism?
If your answer to question 14 is ‘yes’, should the appeal be decided
on the basis of the principles that would be applied on an application
for judicial review or on the merits of the case?
Engagement
1. During engagement, companies suggested that the appeals mechanism
should be quick and affordable, and focused on the merits of the action
taken. Companies mentioned blocking measures and app removal as
areas where they would especially seek to be able to appeal regulator
decisions. Companies also emphasised that for an appeals mechanism
involving judicial scrutiny, an administrative process as seamless as
possible would be needed to minimise bureaucratic burdens, and
accelerate the process. SMEs expressed support for additional
mechanisms other than Judicial Review due to concerns around the costs
and overall accessibility of the latter.
Written consultation
Figure 4: In addition to judicial review should there be a statutory
mechanism for companies to appeal against a decision of the regulator, as
exists in relation to Ofcom under sections 192-196 of the Communications
Act 2003? Note: ​Online portal respondents only.
103. Less than half of all online portal respondents (48%) answered this
question. Of those who did over two thirds (71%) of respondents were in
favour of such an additional statutory mechanism. 15% of respondents
disagreed with such a mechanism and the remaining 14% said they did not
know.
104. A relatively large proportion of respondents suggested specific
circumstances where access to this appeal mechanism should be allowed.
Respondents suggested that the mechanism be available in cases where
decisions related to legal content that is not harmful, when it is claimed that
the best effort was made to deal with an issue by the company, when the
penalty applied is considered disproportionate, and if a company is
adversely affected financially and operationally.
105. The second supplementary question (question 14b) asked whether the
appeal should be decided on the basis of the principles that would be
applied on an application for judicial review (i.e. whether the regulator in
reaching its decision had acted lawfully and fairly) or on the merits of the
specific case. An appeal on the merits of the case would involve a full
reappraisal of both the facts and the applicable law relating to the
regulator’s original decision. The majority of responses were in favour of an
appeal being decided on the merits of the case, but with minimal further
commentary about the reasons for this preference.
106. Overall, responses were supportive of companies in scope of regulation
being able to appeal decisions, offering a range of circumstances when
companies may need to do this. Respondents did not provide further details
about the advantages of a statutory appeals body in particular or how the
duties of such a body could be discharged.
Chapter three: The regulator
1. The White Paper stated that the online harms regime will be overseen and
enforced by an independent regulator. To inform the set up of this regulator,
we asked a number of questions about the identity of the regulator, its
funding model and accountability to Parliament.
2. The White Paper also explained that the government is carefully
considering whether a broader restructuring of the regulatory landscape
would reduce the risk of duplication and minimise burdens on business. Over
the coming months we will engage experts, regulators, industry, civil society
and the wider public to ensure our overarching regulatory regime for digital
technologies is fully coherent, efficient, and effective. This is part of an
ambitious programme of wider work to unlock the huge opportunities
presented by digital technologies whilst minimising the risks.
Proportionality
What further steps could be taken to ensure the regulator will act in
a targeted and proportionate manner?
Engagement
3. In our engagement with industry, companies suggested a model whereby
companies self assess whether their services are in scope, notifying the
regulator if something goes wrong, and where members of the public would
be able to raise concerns with the regulator where a company is not
complying. Another suggestion was that, similar to the banking regulatory
model, the regulator could build the scope through dialogue with industry,
designating systemically important services on which higher responsibilities
would be placed.
4. Freedom of expression groups suggested that further transparency
requirements placed on the regulator, and the incorporation of a duty to
respect freedom of expression within the codes of practice, would also serve
to ensure proportionality.
5. The consideration of freedom of expression is at the heart of our policy
development, and we will ensure that appropriate safeguards are included
throughout the legislation. By reducing the prevalence of online abuse, we
are confident that our approach will support more people to enjoy their right
to freedom of expression and participate in online discussions.
6. At the same time, we also remain confident that proposals as set out here
will not place an undue burden on business. Companies will be expected to
take reasonable and proportionate steps to protect users. This will vary
according to the organisation’s size and the resources available to it, as well
as by the risk associated with the service provided. In recognition of
concerns raised about possible uncertainty about how the duty of care could
be fulfilled, we will ensure that there is sufficient clarity in the regulation and
codes of practice about the applicable expectations on business. This will
help companies to comply with the legislation, and to feel confident that
they have done so appropriately.
Written consultation
7. Around half of respondents answered this question. Those who responded
positively suggested that the regulator take steps to:
adopt an international approach
prioritise vulnerable groups
issue tight guidelines and code of practice
clarify its scope
follow a code of conduct
work with other existing bodies from the tech sector (e.g. Ofcom)
offer support and guidance
receive expert advice/evidence and
collaborate with industry players
8. Many industry respondents expressed approval for the targeted,
proportionate, risk-based and systematic approach proposed in the White
Paper.
9. Multiple responses proposed that the government carry out an economic
impact assessment to determine the anticipated effect regulation will have
upon businesses and the United Kingdom’s economy. A number of individual
respondents also expressed concerns, around the creation of the regulator
and possible restrictions on freedom of expression.
10. In conclusion, responses identified that the government should take
further steps to ensure the regulator will act in a targeted and proportionate
manner. Respondents expected regulation to balance respect of freedom of
expression standards, while applying reasonable requirements and providing
appropriate support for business.
Proportionality
In the White Paper, we made it clear that the regulatory framework
would be proportionate and that we would avoid imposing excessive
burdens. For example, we said:
All companies will be required to take reasonable and
proportionate action to tackle harms on their services, but we will
minimise excessive burdens, particularly on small businesses and
civil society organisations.
The regulator’s initial focus will be on those companies that pose
the biggest and clearest risk of harm to users.
The regulator will set clear expectations of what companies
should do to tackle illegal activity and keep children safe online.
The regulator will be required to assess the action of companies
according to their size and resources, and the age of their users,
as well as the risk and prevalence of harms on their service.
Identity of regulator
11. The White Paper proposed to establish an independent regulator to
implement, oversee and enforce the regulatory framework. The regulator
will be equipped with the powers, resources and expertise it needs to
effectively carry out its role. Ofcom was the only regulator referenced in the
White Paper as a possible candidate.
12. We judge that such a role is best served by an existing regulator with a
proven track record of experience, expertise and credibility. We are minded
to appoint Ofcom as they present the best fit for this role, both in terms of
policy alignment and organisational experience - for instance, in their
existing work, Ofcom already take the risk-based approach that we have
outlined above.
13. Our proposal also sits within a wider programme of work by the
government to respond to the challenges and opportunities presented by
digital technology, through carefully considering the wider institutional
landscape to ensure an effective overall approach to digital regulation that
avoids overlap and confusion.
Should an online harms regulator be: (i) a new public body, or (ii) an
existing public body? If your answer to question 10 is (ii), which body
or bodies should it be?
Engagement
14. In engaging with different groups we learned that most were neutral
towards the identity of the regulator. Some stakeholders felt that the scope
of work envisaged by the White Paper could overwhelm an existing
regulator, but at the same time organisations recognised the inherent
challenges of creating a new body and setting up operations to process an
enormous volume of information, and voiced support for a transitional or
temporary body.
15. Several organisations expressed a preference for Ofcom to be the new
regulator, citing its regulatory expertise. Some civil society groups,
particularly children’s charities, proposed the establishment of an interim
body to reflect the urgency of the harms. Most of the big tech companies
had no preference either way but stressed the point that the regulator
should have the necessary capabilities, infrastructure, resources and
expertise to function effectively.
16. During engagement, respondents emphasised the need for there to be
consistency between existing and new regulatory regimes, with some
suggesting a need for a coordinating body. In their view, the regulator should
draw upon existing expertise across government and across current
arrangements for self and co-regulation.
Written consultation
17. In the consultation we asked whether the proposed regulator should be a
new public body or an existing public body. For those respondents who
preferred an existing public body, we asked which body or bodies it should
be.
18. The response rate via the online portal for this question was low at 38%,
and of these a majority (62%) were in favour of a new public body.
19. There were a number of different reasons for respondents expressing a
preference for a new body. Both organisations and individuals believed that
there was a need for a new body with specific focus and expertise in tech and
online safety. Other less frequent themes such as placing too much burden
on an existing regulator or the need for a regulator to be independent from
government were also identified in the written responses.
20. Over a third of those responding (38%) favoured an existing body; citing
a variety of reasons. The experience of existing organisations and their
understanding of the sector were the two most significant and recurring
advantages highlighted. Respondents also believed it would be cheaper to
set up the regulator within an existing body.
Figure 5: Should an online harms regulator be: (i) a new public body, or (ii)
an existing public body? If you answer to question 10 is (ii), which body or
bodies should it be? Note: ​Online portal respondents only.
21. The sub-question (10a) asked, where respondents had expressed a
preference for an existing body, which body it should be. This question
received a variety of suggestions, with Ofcom receiving the greatest level of
endorsement, particularly amongst organisations.
22. Other common suggestions for the regulator were the Information
Commissioner’s Office (ICO) and the police, and a very small proportion of
respondents believed the courts should act as the regulator. Other
respondents suggested a range of public and private bodies, such as the
Advertising Standards Agency, or the UK Council for Internet Safety, but
also government departments including DCMS, the Home Office and the
Ministry of Justice.
23. Overall the response to this question demonstrated that the options on
regulatory bodies for online harms come with different benefits and risks.
Whilst a new body provides the opportunity for a dedicated focus and an
innovative approach, it was suggested that it will be challenging to
implement a new regulatory regime without the expertise, experience and
organisational structure that an existing body brings.
24. We are minded to give Ofcom the role of the new regulator, in preference
to giving this function to a new body or to another existing organisation. This
preference is based on its organisational experience, robustness, and
experience of delivering challenging, high-profile remits across a range of
sectors. Ofcom is a well-established and experienced regulator, recently
assuming high profile roles such as regulation of the BBC. Ofcom’s focus on
the communications sector means it already has relationships with many of
the major players in the online arena, and its spectrum licensing duties mean
that it is practised at dealing with large numbers of small businesses (both in
terms of regulatory activity and fees collection). Further, Ofcom already
takes a risk-based approach to investigations, similar to that envisaged for
the Online Harms regulator. Ofcom would also remain subject to the Public
Sector Equality Duty in its work on online harms, meaning that it must
consider how its approach or decisions affect people with protected
characteristics.
Funding
25. The White Paper makes clear that in order to recoup both the
implementation costs and running costs of the regulator, the government is
considering fees, charges or a levy on companies whose services are in
scope. This could fund the full range of the regulator’s activity. The
government intends the new regulator to become cost neutral to the public
sector.
A new or existing regulator is intended to be cost neutral: on what
basis should any funding contributions from industry be determined?
Engagement
26. During engagement, companies viewed the application of a charge/tax
with concern. For some, there was a risk that a regulatory charge or tax
would amount to double taxation on the same businesses. Companies with
only a small segment of their business activities within the scope of the
regulator requested clarity on how the regulator funding would be
proportionate and affordable. Others contended that an unintended
consequence of the charge/tax is that it could be diverting money away from
businesses who may use it to address online harms. The collection of
contributions from companies based overseas, particularly from smaller
companies with a higher prevalence of online harms on their platforms
compared to businesses in the UK, was expressed as a further concern.
27. Finally, some companies felt that a business’s revenue/profit would not
be an appropriate basis on which to determine funding contributions from
industry, but instead the age profile of users and work currently being
undertaken by a company to combat online harms should be taken into
consideration. On the other hand, the companies acknowledged that the
inclusion of any non-financial measures may lead to a charge or tax being
subjective.
Written consultation
28. Around a third of respondents answered this question, suggesting a
variety of considerations for funding contributions. The size and type of
business was highlighted as being the main factor on which funding
contributions should be determined. Beyond that, there was also support for
licence fee/taxes on industry, from both organisations and individuals at
broadly the same level.
29. There was some limited support from both individuals and organisations
for the regulator to be funded by the government. There was also limited
support for the regulator to be funded by fines against companies for
breaking the law, and general funding from the private sector.
30. Many individual respondents expressed disagreement with the
formation of the regulator, and, therefore, with the need for a funding
mechanism and the proposal that industry should contribute.
31. In conclusion, respondents and stakeholders both agreed that whilst
funding should primarily be from industry, the model should be
proportionate and practical.
Accountability
32. The White Paper stated that the regulator will be an independent body
and that it will be important to ensure that Parliament is able to scrutinise
the regulator’s work. We consulted on this and on what role Parliament
should play in developing regulatory codes of practice.
33. As the White Paper notes, Parliament’s role particularly “in relation to
codes of practice and guidance issued…varies across different regulatory
regimes, ranging from formal approval to no specific role”. The starting point
of accountability in the White Paper is a duty on the regulator to lay an
annual report and accounts before Parliament and provide Parliament with
information as and when requested.
What role should Parliament play in scrutinising the work of the
regulator, including the development of codes of practice?
Engagement
34. During our engagement with stakeholders, all groups generally
expressed support for Parliament to have a defined oversight role over the
regulator in order to maintain independence from government and build
public trust and hold industry confidence. Freedom of Expression groups
advanced specific proposals calling for parliamentary oversight over codes
of practice to protect fundamental freedoms. Several responses suggested
establishing a dedicated body for reviewing codes to ensure consistency
with civil liberties or establishing an independent Children’s Digital
Champion to inform and report on codes to Parliament. Some respondents
suggested that the regulator should report targeted areas of concern in
platform failures to allow Parliament to debate further evidence.
35. The most popular reason for giving Parliament a role, for both
organisations and individuals, was the need to hold the regulator to account.
Written consultation
36. Broadly, responses showed strong support for parliamentary oversight,
with various ideas on how this should be carried out. Many respondents
called for the regulator to draft the codes of practice independently. Some
responses proposed that codes of practice should be subject to public
consultation and agreed by Parliament. A limited number of organisations
and individual respondents believed that Parliament should have no role in
scrutinising the role of the regulator.
37. Overall, respondents generally agreed that Parliament should have an
important role in scrutinising the work of the regulator. Whilst some
respondents advocated a more active role for parliament in developing
codes of practice, others maintained that this would encroach upon the
regulator’s independence.
Codes of practice
The White Paper talked about the different codes of practice that
the regulator will issue to outline the processes that companies
need to adopt to help demonstrate that they have fulfilled their duty
of care to their users.
The kind of processes the codes of practice will focus on are
systems, procedures, technologies and investment, including in
staffing, training and support of human moderators.
As such, the codes of practice will contain guidance on, for
example, what steps companies should take to ensure products
and services are safe by design or deliver prompt action on
harmful content or activity.
Given the range of services in scope of the regulatory framework,
some of the expectations below may not be applicable to every
company.
The primary responsibility for each company in scope is that they
will be required to complete an assessment of the risk associated
with its service(s) and take reasonable steps to guard against the
risk of harm in order to fulfill its duty of care.
We do not expect there to be a code of practice for each category
of harmful content, however, we intend to publish interim codes of
practice on how to tackle online terrorist and Child Sexual
Exploitation and Abuse (CSEA) content and activity in the coming
months.
Chapter four: Non-legislative
1. Alongside the proposed regulatory framework, we are committed to
implementing a number of non-legislative measures in order to ensure a
holistic response to online harms. In order to inform these measures, the
consultation asked questions about safety by design, children’s online safety
and media literacy.
Innovation and adoption of safety technologies
2. The White Paper set out the government’s ambition to position the UK as
a world leader in safety technology. It included commitments that the
government and new regulator will work with leading industry bodies and
other regulators to support innovation in and adoption of products and
services that support user safety, and the growth of the UK’s safety
technology market. It proposed specific action to assess the online safety
sector’s capability and potential, and to explore how organisations can
securely access training data to develop AI solutions while ensuring that AI
use is safe and ethical.
What are the greatest opportunities and barriers for (i) innovation
and (ii) adoption of safety technologies by UK organisations, and
what role should government play in addressing these?
Engagement
1. During our engagement with industry, organisations emphasised that
machine learning solutions required large amounts of training data.
Several highlighted the opportunity for government or the regulator to
enable the development of a system of common reference datasets,
which third parties could use to safely and securely develop and test
machine learning solutions. Organisations were supportive of the
‘regulatory sandbox’ model (ie. allowing businesses to test innovations in
a controlled environment), and several respondents suggested that the
data trust model could facilitate data sharing around online harms. Some
organisations highlighted that machine learning still needs human
assistance to identify context and nuance.
Written consultation
4. The written consultation asked respondents to identify the opportunities
and barriers for innovation and adoption and to suggest how the government
could work to address these. This question received a relatively low number
of responses, particularly from individuals.
5. Where a response was given, a relatively large number of responses
expressed disagreement with the overall proposals for regulation, with many
focusing on concerns around freedom of expression. Many responses, in
particular from individuals, did not engage with the different elements of the
question, making it difficult in many cases to identify clear reasons for
disagreement or concerns with the focus of the question.
6. Some respondents expressed concerns that regulation could stifle
innovation if it was over-prescriptive, disproportionate or inflexible, or if a
regulator did not have sufficient in-house technical capability. Conversely,
several responses highlighted the positive role that regulators could play in
supporting innovation, for example by increasing competition, preventing
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supporting innovation, for example by increasing competition, preventing
monopolies and addressing market failures.
7. In terms of opportunities, the most common one highlighted for
innovation was the role that government could play through influence and
advocacy, for example by supporting cross-sector initiatives to share
technologies and ideas to tackle potential harms, and through using its
convening power to help ensure closer collaboration and coordination
across the value chain. In particular, organisations highlighted the positive
role that groups such as the Technology Coalition and the Global Internet
Forum to Counter Terrorism played in supporting the development and
adoption of cross-sector solutions, such as hash-sharing databases for illegal
content. A number of respondents felt that more action was needed to
strengthen the evidence base used to inform and assess technical
innovations - for example, through greater research into user behaviour
online.
8. Some respondents to the written consultation focused on the role that
government and the regulator could play in encouraging a competitive and
world-leading market in online safety solutions, through which companies of
all sizes could access a range of solutions to achieve safer outcomes for
users. Several organisations felt that more could be done by government to
articulate priorities for investment or innovation, or to identify the standards
which safety technologies should adhere; to provide assistance in linking
SMEs with larger organisations; and where appropriate to fund programmes
of development support for startups and scaleups, for example through
accelerators or incubator programmes.
9. In terms of the opportunities highlighted for adoption of safety
technologies, many responses, particularly from organisations, highlighted
the need to provide companies with high-quality information, training and
guidance. Some responses focused on how regulation, government
influence and public pressure also had the potential to drive adoption of
safety technology.
10. Many of the barriers to both innovation and adoption were similar.
Organisations were particularly concerned about the cost of innovation and
adoption of safety technologies, and a potential lack of clear definitions of
safety standards by a regulator. There was concern that smaller platforms’
ability to innovate for safety might be restricted by regulation geared toward
the capabilities and needs of larger platforms.
11. Overall, the consultation response suggested a number of ways in which
the government or the regulator could support the innovation and adoption
of safety technology. These were suggestions such as designing the
regulatory framework to ensure that the goals of innovation and safety are
intertwined, advocacy of the emerging safety tech sector, and enabling a
data and AI infrastructure that supports innovation, competition and
transparency. The main barrier highlighted for both innovation and adoption
was the cost to businesses of such development.
Safety by Design
12. In the White Paper, the government committed to developing a safety by
design framework to make it easier for start-ups and small businesses to
embed safety during the design, development or updates of products and
services.
What, if any, are the most significant areas in which organisations
need practical guidance to build products that are safe by design?
Engagement
13. Throughout our engagement with industry during the lead up to the
Online Harms White Paper, stakeholders expressed broad agreement and
recognition that standards of safety are improved when organisations build
in user-safety at the design and development stage of their online services.
They also recognised that a safety by design approach was needed for
smaller companies in particular, and that the government should help them
build capacity and technical expertise as they grow. Stakeholders also
argued that assistance for designing safer services was specifically required
in areas such as the needs of vulnerable users, age assurance, and more
generally the different safety considerations applicable to children and
adults.
Written consultation
14. This question had a relatively low number and wide variety of written
responses, suggesting both drop off in the response rate and potential
confusion amongst respondents due to the specificity of the question. This
pattern of responses could also potentially indicate a lack of understanding
amongst responders on what the principle of safety by design encompasses.
This is compounded by the lack of specificity amongst the noticeable
minority of, mostly individual, responses which expressed their
disagreement with the overall proposals.
15. Of the responses which suggested areas for inclusion in the guidance,
many seemed to focus on guidance in general and not specifically in areas
that would enable organisations to build services that are safe by design.
Educating users and new technologies were the most common areas
highlighted as being those where organisations need guidance. Other
responses also highlighted general compliance, data privacy, ethical
guidance, encryption and content moderation.
16. Responses from organisations in particular highlighted child safety as a
key area where organisations require guidance. This was followed by calls for
overarching guidance on all areas, as well as age assurance. Responses from
charities for girls and young women, and for other vulnerable groups,
suggested that members of these groups should be actively involved and
consulted in designing safe products.
17. During direct engagement over the consultation period, organisations
also raised the need for broader organisational support and culture-changing
efforts to help embed a safety by design approach. Organisations in
particular felt that, while, specific guidance on high impact safety measures
in many of the areas highlighted above are needed and effective,
interventions further “upstream” in the design process would also be an
impactful way to deliver a safety by design approach - and for this, they
argued, government guidance is needed. They also recognised that support
on safety by design needs to address all levels within an organisation to be
effective at driving change.
18. Overall, it is clear that there is a strong feeling amongst organisations
that greater guidance to enable a safety by design approach is needed. The
breadth of the responses and the general lack of specificity on what type of
intervention would be helpful also suggests that greater education is
required on the function and objective of ‘safety by design’. Work is taking
place to develop the key emerging themes, including guidance on specific
high impact safety measures and supporting safety interventions upstream
in the design process. For example, work is already underway with the VoCO
(Verification of Children Online) project, a cross-sector research initiative
undertaken in partnership between DCMS, HO and GCHQ, exploring the
concept of age assurance as a risk-based approach to recognising child
users online, without undermining their privacy. The project has engaged
with children, parents, industry & regulators and other experts to build a
vision for a safer internet for children, and it has produced research into key
technologies, data sources, standards and commercial models. Future work
will look to develop further the key emerging themes, including guidance on
specific high impact safety measures and supporting safety interventions
upstream in the design process.
Child online safety
19. The White Paper committed to make the UK the safest place to be
online. It also recognised that users want to be empowered to manage their
online safety, and that of their children, but there is insufficient support in
place and users currently feel vulnerable online.
20. As part of the overarching mission to protect the rights of users online,
the duty of care will enshrine in legislation the requirement for companies to
have appropriate and proportionate measures and processes in place to
ensure a higher level of protection for children and vulnerable users. The
extent of those processes would be correlated with the risk of harm to young
people taking place on the site. This provides the most comprehensive
approach possible to protecting children from inappropriate content online,
and also enables the regulatory framework to deliver the objectives of Part 3
of the Digital Economy Act,. Companies would be able to use a number of
methods to protect children, including possibly - but not necessarily - age
assurance tools, which we expect will continue to play a key role in keeping
children safe online.
Should the government be doing more to help people manage their
own and their children’s online safety and, if so, what?
Engagement
21. One of the key themes of our engagement was parents’ concerns about
the safety of their children online. Parents’ groups, especially, considered
online safety to be a particular area where parents’ confidence needs to be
raised. Although parents felt that they know their children best and are
therefore usually the best placed to tailor standard advice for them, they
also agreed on the need for more advice and education on how to be online
safely. Organisations against violence against women and girls (VAWG)
argued that education for online safety should focus not only on behaviours
to adopt, but also on discouraging adoption of negative behaviours.
Written consultation
22. From those individual respondents using the online portal, there was an
almost even split between those who agreed with the question and those
who disagreed (49% and 51% respectively). Conversely, this result was very
different amongst organisations who responded online, with 95% agreeing
that the government should be doing more.
Figure 6: Should the government be doing more to help people manage their
own and their children’s online safety and, if so, what? Note: ​Online portal
respondents only.
23. Of those who responded “yes” and provided suggestions for what the
government should do more of, the most common response was for the
government to provide guidance, training and resources. Following this,
responses focused on the need to increase education for parents and
children. Some responses highlighted other specific areas for intervention
looking at increasing and improving education, for example providing
resources for teachers and implementing media literacy and privacy
education.
24. Other responses included specific suggestions for actions the
government should take, for example implementing age assurance
measures and increasing the provision and use of family-friendly filters.
25. Some tech companies and civil society organisations, including women’s
groups and children’s charities, agreed that there should be a role for the
regulator to play in empowering and educating users. Likewise, many
respondents noted that behavioural changes that prevent the content from
coming online in the first place are crucial. Nevertheless, some cautioned
against ‘blaming the victim’, and any empowering methods that might
absolve companies of their duties and liability.
26. Other respondents from children and vulnerable groups’ charities
argued that schools should incorporate digital literacy into their curriculum.
Similarly, financial services companies urged economic crime to be included
in the national curriculum.
27. A few organisations mentioned that an advisory body of relevant public
sector and industry experts such as UK Council for Internet Safety (UKCIS)
has value in facilitating communication, anticipating future harms to
children online, and coordinating activity to address the complex
environment children encounter online.
28. Law enforcement organisations suggested expanding the government’s
Cyber Aware Campaign to cover online abuse and threats, while retaining
information about cyber security and crime.
29. Although written consultation responses highlighted some mixed views
on the issue, overall the feedback gathered across both a large proportion of
responses and in our engagement points to a strong appetite for more
support from the government in helping users feel empowered in managing
their safety and that of their children.
Education & Awareness
30. The White Paper committed to make the UK the safest place to be
online. It also recognised that users want to be empowered to manage their
online safety, and that of their children, but there is insufficient support in
place and users currently feel vulnerable online.
What, if any, role should the regulator have in relation to education
and awareness activity?
31. In the consultation we asked what role, if any, the regulator should have
in relation to education and awareness activity. A relatively large proportion
of responses, mostly from individuals, stated that the regulator should have
no role in education and awareness activity.
32. Education and awareness are key to supporting children to navigate the
digital world safely and the statutory relationships, sex and health education
curriculum in England will teach them the rules and principles for keeping
safe online.
Engagement
33. Throughout our engagement, digital education and awareness were key
recurring themes. Some of the industry organisations, as well as children
and advocacy groups, emphasised the presence of several existing online
safety education programmes and questioned whether the regulator’s role
would be to reduce or streamline what is already there to improve quality.
Many felt that the regulator could have an important role in creating a
framework for evaluating the impact of existing education and awareness
activity. Others recognised that there could be a role for the regulator or for
government in supporting the most vulnerable children. Some also
proposed a potential role for the regulator in disseminating alerts about
emerging online threats for young people.
Written consultation
34. Of the written consultation responses which agreed the regulator should
have a role, many responses suggested it should provide information, advice
and guidance, and should work to protect and educate all users.
35. Many responses suggested the regulator should work with other
organisations, institutions or government departments to jointly improve
education materials and the online safety curriculum, with a number
focusing on a need for increased education for children. Additionally,
responses stated that the regulator should work to quality assure
educational materials and ensure companies fund educational programmes.
36. In line with this, among organisations, respondents from different
sectors suggested that the regulator create a national awareness-raising
campaign with calls to action for citizens of all ages and technical abilities,
including children, teenagers, parents and other adults.
37. Advocacy organisations also argued that via the regulator the
government should play a role in making the public aware of how companies
are regulated and what their rights and protections are.
38. Overall, while some respondents felt that the regulator should not have
a role in education and awareness, others made a range of suggestions for
how the regulator might take specific action, including: overseeing industry
activity and spend; creating an evaluation framework for assessing
education and awareness activity and promoting awareness of online safety.
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